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PROCEDURE
Section I-The Pleading Stage
Service of Process. Immunity of Non-Resident Witness.
In Davis v. Hackney1 the Supreme Court of Appeals extended
the doctrine of immunity from service of process with regard to
non-resident witnesses. In this case one Hackney sought to
quash service of process upon himself and service of attachment
upon his automobile. Hackney was a resident of Tennessee who
was summoned to appear as a witness in a criminal proceeding in
Virginia. Hackney accepted a subpoena which was not issued or
served in compliance with the Uniform Act relative to out of
state witnesses.2 Immediately after the criminal hearing, service
of process was had upon Hackney in a civil proceeding and his
automobile was attached. Davis, the plaintiff in the civil pro-
ceeding, contended that the Uniform Act3 displaced the com-
mon law rule, and that even should the Act be construed as in
furtherance of the common law, the immunity should not extend
to the automobile as this would result in a miscarriage of justice.
The Court in affirming the trial court's opinion ruled in favor of
Hackney and held that the Uniform Act was passed in furtherance
of the common law and that his automobile should likewise be
free from attachment in this instance.
There should be no quarrel with this decision. In Wheeler v.
Flintoff4 (1931) it was held that a non-resident party to a crim-
inal prosecution was exempt from civil process. Similarly, it had
long been the rule in Virginia that non-resident witnesses are
immune from service of process while attending court.3 It would
appear inequitable to cast aside a doctrine of such long standing
where a non-resident witness has waived strict performance with
the statute.
The decision affords Virginia authority for the extension of
personal immunity to the non-resident's property present in the
forum, necessary for his attendance in court. As to the witnesses'
1 196 Va. 651, 85 S.E.2d 245 (1955).
2 Va. Code §19-242, 19-252 (1950) (Supp. 1954).
8 Ibid.
4 156 Va. 923, 159 S.E.2d 112 (1931).
5 Commonwealth v. Ronald, 4 Call. (8 Va.) 97 (1786).
clothes there has been substantial unanimity among the courts in
holding such immune; the closer issue arises with respect to auto-
mobiles. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, in a
modem approach, likewise held Hackney's automobile immune
from attachment. In practical effect, the Court reasoned since a
horse was considered a "necessary" in 1880,7 that an automobile
in this age should receive the same treatment."
In Reese v. Reese9 there was involved an attempt to collaterally
assail service of process. The appellant in a partition suit had
sought to set aside a prior judgment against him on the basis that
he was in New York or Kentucky when the judgment was ren-
dered. Counsel intimated that the officer making the service and
return should be "acquainted with the facts in the case" 10 and
should have the return corrected due to his alleged mistake in
making substituted service. Once again the Court was forced to
drive home to counsel that in Virginia a judgment once rendered
cannot be collaterally assailed.11
Jurisdiction. Although several minor issues concerning juris-
diction in courts of law were disposed of by the Supreme Court
of Appeals in 1955,12 the troublesome area appeared to involve
equity jurisdiction. In line with the Virginia view'3 that the
courts of equity, having once acquired jurisdiction, do not lose it
because jurisdiction of the same matter is given to law courts
(unless the statute conferring jurisdiction uses restrictive words),
the Court in Overnite Transportation Co. v. Woodfin'4 preserved
4 Bridges v. Sheldon, 7 Fed. 17, 43 (1880).
7 Ibid.
8 See 2 W. & M. Rev. Va. L. 180 (1955) for a case comment involving
Davis v. Hackney.
9 196 Va. 1028, 87 S.E.2d 133 (1955).
10 Id. at 1038, 87 S.E.2d at 138.
11 The futility of counsel's efforts can be further brought out by the fact
that Virginia is one of the few remaining states in which the officer's
return is conclusive. So even in a direct attack his premise would be
weak. Burks, Pleading and Practice, §98 (4th Ed.)12 i.e. In Lee v. Virginian Ry. Co. the Court disclaimed jurisdiction on the
basis that a railway employee seeking damages for breach of contract
should exhaust all administrative remedies provided under the Railway
Labor Act before resorting to Federal or State courts for relief.
18Buchanan v. Buchanan, 174 Va. 255, 6 S.E.2d 612, 621 (1940); 1 Bartons
Ch. Pr. (2 ed.), pp. 60-1.
14 196 Va. 747, 85 S.E.2d 217 (1955).
injunctive relief in the face of a statute 0 which provided the legal
remedy of fine or imprisonment for the offense of a common car-
rier's charging a lesser freight rate than that fixed by the State
Corporation Commission. The defendant in demurring admitted
violating the statute but contended that the plaintiff had an ade-
quate remedy at law, namely, punishment for the misdemeanor
by statute. In overruling the demurrer, the Court placed em-
phasis upon the threatened invasion of the right of franchise.10
Thus, where valuable property rights are threatened with inter-
ference, the criminal remedy of the act is considered as separable
from injunctive relief in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits. 17
In Cauthorn v. Cauthorn,'8 it was determined that where prop-
erty is partitionable in kind, the jurisdiction of equity ceases with
regard to sale of the land. This result is predicated upon the fact
that the statute' 9 which authorizes a court of equity to sell land
in a partition suit requires that it be judicially determined that
partition in kind cannot conveniently be made. Therefore, in
light of the statute, a sale which had been made by the equity
court of an incompetent's interest in property which was de-
termined on record as partitionable in kind was deemed void for
lack of jurisdiction. It was further held that strict compliance
with statutory provisions must be had since equity has no inherent
jurisdiction to order a sale of land for the purpose of partition.
Venue. In MacPherson v. Green2° an action in detinue was
removed under Virginia Code 8-157, "for good cause shown."
Removal was granted on the grounds that the plaintiff "verily
believe[ d]" that such prejudice existed against him "in the minds
of prospective jurors" 21 of the Circuit Court of Arlington
County that he would not be given a fair and impartial trial.
On appeal the removal was held to be reversible error. The
Court reiterated its position22 that a conclusion or mere belief of
a party that he will not receive a fair trial is not sufficient basis
1s Va. Code S46-2 (1950).
10 Turner v. Hicks, 164 Va. 612, 180 S.E.2d 543 (1935).
17 196 Va. 747, 750, 85 S.E.2d 217, 219 (1955).
18 196 Va. 614, 85 S.E.2d 256 (1955).
19 Va. Code S8-690 and 58-692 (1950).
20 197 Va. 27, 87 S.E.2d 785 (1955).
211 d. at 29, 87 S.E.2d at 787.
2 2 Bosweli v. Flockhart, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 364 (1837).
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to justify change of venue in a civil action. Facts and circum-
stances must be sworn to that a fair trial cannot be had; and since
the record on appeal showed no such evidence, removal was
denied.
Detinue v. Libel. Also present in the MacPherson2= case was
an example of the fatality of improper pleading at law. The
plaintiff had been a treasurer of Arlington County and was run-
ning for re-election. A banker sent the plaintiff a letter referring
to an enclosed check which was purportedly in payment for fees
for effecting loans. The plaintiff entrusted the letter to a friend
who wrongfully gave the letter to the defendant, the plaintiff's
opponent in the election. The defendant then mailed circulars
containing excerpts from the letter to voters and charged that
the plaintiff was using public office for private gain. The plaintiff
attempted to rebut the charges with advertisements in the local
papers, but he lost the election. The court on appeal held for the
plaintiff in the detinue action. That is, he received the letter
back. However, no damages were allowed since detinue is a pos-
sessory action for the recovery of specific personal property and
damages for its detention.2 4 (Emphasis added.) Here the dam-
ages sought were for the misuse of the letter via publication and
not its detention. Therefore the plaintiff should have proceeded
under an action for libel and slander, in which case the issues
would have been entirely different. It appears from the record
that the plaintiff initially included in his declaration an action for
slander which was stricken upon objection; had he appealed on
this basis, the possibility of recovery probably would have been
more favorable. In any event this case points out to practitioners
that remnants of strict common law "categorizing of actions" are
still evident in Virginia despite the proposed flexibility of "Notice
Pleading", provided for in. the Rules of Court.
Joinder of Breadi of Warranty and Negligence. Although
the fourth edition of Burks Pleading and Practice (1952) fails to
mention the duPont25 case, in which there was held to be proper
joinder of negligence and breach of warranty, the question posed
28 197 Va. 27, 87 S.E.2d 785 (1955).
24 Burks P1. & Pr, 4th Ed. 1125, p, 239.
2 E. L duPont de Nemours and Co. v. Universal Moulded Products Corp,
191 Va. 525,62 S.E.2d 233 (1950).
by the duPont case concerning possible misjoinder should be of
significance to Virginia lawyers. That question is, has the Su-
preme Court of Appeals relaxed its position with regard to joinder
of tort and contract? The issue was partially sidestepped in the
duPont case, the court laying much emphasis on the point that
the gravamen of breach of warranty sounds in tort. As to how
far this trend will continue, one can but speculate. The only
clue which we have in the duPont case is general in nature. The
Court states:
In Virginia, the distinction between common law forms
of actions has largely disappeared since the adoption of our
notice of motion statute . .. In the interpretation of that
statute we have adopted a liberality of procedure.2
In a recent case,27 however, negligence and breach of war-
ranty were joined and there was no mention of the duPont case
or the point involved. Either counsel were not cognizant of the
duPont decision, or they were resigned to the holding and saw
no basis for distinction. In Gleason Co. v. International Harvester
and Richardson28 (1955), the court in its decision states "Harves-
ter was neither negligent nor guilty of a breach of contract."
(emphasis added)' At first blush it would appear that the Court
was condoning joinder of tort and contract. Perhaps incorrect
terminology was used and "breach of contract" as described in
this case was meant to cover only breach of warranty.
Regardless, it is submitted that joinder of tort and contract
may be permissible in the not too distant future in Virginia.
Though the editors of Burks in 1952 did not feel that the duPont
case was worthy of mention, the decision has undoubtedly left an
indelible impression on many Virginia practitioners. In any
event, it is submitted that the Gleason case probably affords no
more than an echo for the duPont holding, and it can safely be
concluded that those practitioners who choose to join tort and
contract beyond breach of warranty and negligence will at least
be treading on shaky ground.
26Id. at 534, 62 S.E.2d at 236.
27Gleason v. International Harvester and Richardson, 197 Va. 25S, 88
S.E.2d 904 (1955).
28 Ibid.
Equity Pleading. Bill of Complaint. Of special interest
to Virginia attorneys is the case of Matney v. McClanaban;29 for
in this instance one can note that any tendency towards "loose
pleading" in equity as compared with law will be immediately
checked, regardless of the general rule that equity looks to sub-
stance rather than form. In Matney, the complainant sought re-
moval of a cloud from his title to mineral rights under a tract of
land, an injunction to restrain trespass by the defendants, an ac-
counting for the value of coal removed, and recovery of the stat-
utory penalty for mining within five feet of the boundary line.
In a lengthy bill of complaint ° the complainant failed to allege
the exact boundary lines of his property and he also failed to state
clearly what parts of one of his alleged tracts were involved in a
particular interlock. Demurrers were interposed with leave to
complainant to file an amended bill "if he be so advised." Instead
of filing an amended bill he sought to rely upon his original bill;
whereupon the circuit judge dismissed the case. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision on the basis that the
allegations of the complainant's bill were vague, involved, and
uncertain. As a result the defendants were not advised of the
area of the property which they were purportedly mining in a
wrongful manner.
Under the specific facts of this particular case, one must
sympathize with the Court's decision in that the complainant did
not amend his bill when given the opportunity. In theory, how-
ever, this case raises several questions. Is equity a step behind law
in Virginia with respect to "Notice Pleading"? Did the Court
actually go further than "scratching the merits" in disposing of
the bill? Was the defendant in reality apprised of a controversy
involving his property or that of an adjoining landowner, and
could a commissioner in chancery have been appointed to iron out
preliminary issues? The answers to these questions are matters
of conjecture; but it is submitted that with the recent advent of
Rules of Court incorporating notice pleading, stringent common
law factual construction of the declaration at law were to a
great extent abolished by provisions for the more liberal motion
29 197 Va. 454, 90 S.E.2d 128 (1955).
80 The bill of complaint consisted of ten printed pages, to which was at-
tached seventeen exhibits comprising twenty-four additional pages.
Perhaps this proved exasperating to the Court since brevity is the sign
of good pleading!
for judgment. Under the Matney decision it would appear that
Rules of Court should be similarly adjusted with respect to the bill
of complaint. Else Virginia would be in the anomalous position
of having a liberal notice procedure in actions at law; whereas
equity, which always has looked to substance rather than form,
would be burdened by continuing strictness in the bill of com-
plaint. In any event it is submitted that as a result of the Matney
decision, it will be more difficult for a pleader to "toe the mark"
in a suit to remove a cloud from title than to do so, for example,
in a negligence action.
Counterclaim. In Short v. Long,3' the defendant had been
awarded $400 on a counterclaim in a negligence action. It was
alleged by the plaintiff that since the defendant had proved dam-
ages of a larger amount, the jury in effect apportioned the dam-
ages without consideration of liability. On appeal the judgment
was affirmed, on the rationale that the plaintiff could not have
been damaged by such a verdict. Therefore, where a counter-
claim is now pleaded, it is submitted that as a practical matter
juries may apportion negligence in Virginia where the evidence
is conflicting. Although the comparative negligence doctrine is
not law in Virginia the same result may be reached by the pro-
cedure in this case whereby a jury could reason "X was more
negligent than Y, therefore we will give Y something-but not
as much as he proved since he himself was negligent." In Vir-
ginia what would be termed "textwise" a regrettable occurrence,
with contributory negligence an absolute bar, may now be turned
into mitigation by means of a counterclaim, where a jury is
involved.
In National Bank and Trust Company at Cbarlottesville v.
Castle, the bank, assignee of sums due under a building contract,
sought to defeat an attempt by the defendant general contractor,
to set-off breaches of the assignor subcontractor's contract which
occurred after the assignment. The bank was unsuccessful in its
contention; the Court held that the defendant's right consisted of
recoupment rather than set-off and therefore should be superior.
Although Rule 3:8 of the Virginia Rules of Court has liberalized
the pleading of set-off, recoupment, and counterclaim, this case
81 197 Va. 104, 87 S.E.2d 776 (1955).
82 196 Va. 686, 85 S.E.2d 228 (1955).
points out that substantive differences between the three still exist
in Virginia. Particular emphasis was placed in the Castle case
upon the fact that the transaction was intrinsic in nature provid-
ing a diminution of the assignee's claim; therefore recoupment
followed. Burks' Pleading and Practice= states:
The scope of the Virginia Rules of Court is such as to
embrace under the broad term "counterclaim" both set-off
and recoupment and to render the statutes and their techni-
cal distinctions of far less practical importance.
Though this statement appears to be correct from an adjective
point of view, Virginia practitioners should note that under the
Castle case, the remnants of'the substantive common law distinc-
tions between set-off and recoupment are still extant.
Limitation of Actions. Norwood, Adm'r. v. Buffey 84 in-
volved a construction of Va. Code Section 8-634 (1950) which
provides for the one year limitation period for wrongful death
actions. The plaintiff had suffered a voluntary nonsuit after the
statutory period had expired .but reinstated the action on the
same day. The question involved was whether the section of
the statute providing exclusion of time from the statutory period
where the action "for any cause abates or is dismissed without
determining the merits" would be construed liberally so as to
protect the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals held in favor of the
plaintiff in considering the section remedial in nature. Though
the word "nonsuit" was not used in the statute, the Court fol-
lowed a liberal interpretation in considering this procedure within
the purview of this section.
The words "for any cause" appear to embrace an extremely
wide area in Virginia, for in this case, the abatement was volun-
tary and on the part of the plaintiff.
Montgomery Knight, Jr.
88 Burks Pleading and Practice, Fourth Edition, p. 443.
84 196 Va. 1051, 86 S.E.2d 809 (1955).
